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A Historical/Political Analysis
By M a m o o n A m in Z a k i

hen the Gulf war between Iran
and Iraq began in 1980, many
people thought that Iraq would
achieve a swift and decisive victory because
of the chaotic situation of the Iranian
government.1 But Iran stood fast and the
war goes on. The Gulf war, like all other
wars, is bound to come to an end sooner or
later because both belligerents are pro
fusely hemorrhaging economically, mili
tarily, and most of all, in human casualties.
And the outcome of this war may lead to a
social change of historical magnitude not
only in the Middle East, but also beyond the
region.
Imam Ayatollah Khomeini’s regime
needs a decisive victory in order to justify
the enormous casualties of young “mar
tyrs” (estimated to be more than half a
million), and the loss of property sustained
by Iran. So far, Khomeini has been able to
justify this holocaust in the name of God.
This sacrifice, asserts Khomeini, shall not
go in vain, for God shall reward the be
lievers with a decisive victory. After all, it is
written in the holy book of Islam, the
Qur’an, that whenever the believers fight
against the infidels (in this case the Iraqis)
God would send his armies to support the
believers.
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This argument has been convincing to
the Iranians. If Khomeini or his successor
succeeded in toppling the regime of Sad
dam Hussein, the concept of the Divine
support to the Iranian regime would be
corroborated among devout Moslems.
Khomeini and his followers would capitalize
on this concept and inspire a religious tide in
the Moslem world.
There are more than 900 million
Moslems scattered all over the world, with a
large majority living in underdeveloped
nations, or as underprivileged minorities
elsewhere. A victorious Iran would be able
to inspire the Moslems of the entire Ara
bian Peninsula, Africa, and the Far East to
galvanize and start a holy march against the
enemies of Islam.
Far beyond the boundaries of the Middle
East and Africa, the echo of an Islamic
victory would be heard in such remote
countries as Afghanistan, the Soviet Union
and China, for example. Moslems in
Afghanistan constitute a majority of the
population. The leftist government now
sitting in Kabul, the capital city, with the
help of the Soviet Union, has been fighting
against the Mujahidin fighters since 1979.
And the Mujahidin still control more than
half of the territory in Afghanistan.
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The Moslem tide would substantially en
hance the military prowess of the Afghani
Mujahidin and probably convince the Sovi
ets of the futility of the idea of annexing
Afghanistan.
In fact, the Soviet Union itself would be
facing substantial difficulties controlling its
50 million minority (almost 25 percent of
the Soviet population) of Moslems who, for
the last six decades, have been impervious
to Marxist indoctrination. Furthermore,
both China and India have large Moslem
minorities and are eagerly awaiting the
outcome of the Gulf war.2
On the other hand, if Saddam Hussein
succeeds in surviving this war (which he
started), the picture of the Middle East
would be dramatically reversed. The re
ligious tide would be pushed back and the
secular-nationalist-socialist ideology would
prevail. A non-victorious Iran would be a
perfidious event in the Moslem world and
Khomeini’s claim of Divine support would
be rendered fallacious.
Saddam Hussein’s main assets are his
political experience, his enormous eco
nomic potential and his youth — when
compared to the octogenarian Khomeini.
His tenure in office has been contempo
raneous with such outstanding Arab lead
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ers as Presidents Gamal Abdul Nasser and
Anwar al-Sadat of Egypt, King Hussein of
Jordan, and President Hafez al-Assad of
Syria. Furthermore, he enjoys the advan
tage of enormous oil riches. All the abovementioned statesmen have presided over
poor countries and depended on outside
economic aid.
President Nasser’s radical pan-Arabist
ideology during the 1950s and ’60s was not
dissimilar to that of Saddam Hussein. But,
Nasser’s Egypt was plagued by overpopula
tion, widespread disease, high illiteracy,
foreign debt and shortage of funds and
economic resources. His leadership de
pended basically on charisma and electrify
ing rhetoric. Egypt’s social ills played an
important role in hampering Nasser’s panArabist plans.
In contrast, Iraq is a country of medium
size (about the size of California) with a
population of 14 million, and it sits on
enormous oil reserves. There are uncon
firmed reports that Iraq’s oil reserves
exceed by far that of Saudi Arabia. Plus,
with its two great rivers and fertile land,
Iraq has the capability, if its full agrarian
potential is exploited, to feed all of its Arab
neighbors.
Should he survive the war, Saddam

Hussein, with his economic revenues, will
be able to embark anew on vast develop
ment projects for Iraq, as well as influence
the future of the Arab world.

Historical Background
The dispute between Iraq and Iran is an old
one, the roots of which go back to the 16th
century when Iraq, then Mesopotamia, was
a province of the Ottoman Empire.3
In the beginning, the two adjacent old
Muslim Empires — the Ottoman and the
Persian — were seemingly on good terms.
However, when Shali Ismael Safavi of Persia
adopted Shi’ism as the official sect of his
government, strife with the Sunni Otto
mans began and lasted for centuries.
Sultan Selim Yauz, the King of the
Ottomans, who was fanatically religious,
dedicated his efforts to the extermination
from his empire of the “heresy” of Shi’ism.
The Ottoman and the Persian armies
collided in 1514 in the valley of Chaldiran,
whereupon the Persians were soundly de
feated.
In 1555, the Treaty of Umasiyah was
signed, which represented the first diplo
matic attempt to adjust the relations of the
two Muslim empires and to demarcate the
borders separating them. Again, a ter
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ritorial dispute erupted in the 17th century
and the Persians attacked the Ottomans.
Sultan Murad IV defeated the Persians and,
subsequently, the Qasr Sherine Treaty was
signed in 1639. This treaty included an
important provision in which the Persians
acknowledged full sovereignty of the Ot
tomans over the Shatt al-Arab River. Shatt
al-Arab is a navigable river, 218 kilometers
long and 700 meters wide. It is formed from
the confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates
Rivers, and flows in the southern part of
Iraq.
In 1727, the Persians attacked again, but
the war ended with the signing of the Amir
Ashraf Treaty within the year. Provision
seven of the treaty specified that the entire
territory of Arabistan east of Shatt al-Arab
River was to be placed under the domain of
the Ottomans.
In 1747, The Nadir Shah Treaty was
signed and it reemphasized the terms of the
Qasr Sherine and Amir Ashraf Treaties.
Subsequent to the Nadir Shah Treaty, the
two empires witnessed a period of relative
tranquility until 1818 when the Persians
once again attempted to conquer the Shatt
al-Arab River. Severe battles erupted and
the Persians were defeated. The signing of
the first Arzroom Treaty followed in 1823.
Because of the constant Persian threat to
the extremely strategic and economically
important territory of the Shatt al-Arab
River, the Ottomans decided to solve the
problem with their neighbors once and for
all. An enormous military campaign was
waged by the Ottomans and the Persians
were pushed back almost to the outskirts of
their capital city of Tehran. However, Rus
sia and Great Britain, both with interests in
the Middle East, intervened and the war
was stopped. Subsequently, lengthy nego
tiations followed, under the auspices of the
two great powers, which culminated in the
signing of the second Arzroom Treaty in
1847 by Shah Muhammad and Sultan Abdul
Majid. In this treaty, the Ottomans retained
the Shatt al-Arab River within the borders
of the province of Mesopotamia, but, for the
first time, surrendered the entire territory
of Arabistan to the Persians.
A quadripartite international commis
sion, comprising Russia, Great Britain,
Persia and the Ottomans, was formed to
finalize the demarcation of the borders
between the Persian and the Ottoman
Empires. However, eruption of war be
tween Great Britain and Persia in 1851, and
the outbreak of the Crimean War in 1854,
brought those diplomatic efforts to a halt.4
DIRECTIONS OCTOBER 1987
PublishedNEW
by Digital
Howard @ Howard University,

Later, efforts of the quadripartite com
mission were resumed and culminated in
the signing of two agreements — the
Protocol of Tehran in 1911 and the Con
stantinople Protocol in 1913.
In 1914 the commission finalized the
demarcation of the borders, incorporating
the entire bed of the Shatt al-Arab River
within the borders of Mesopotamia.
Article five of the Constantinople Pro
tocol specifically laid down that “as soon as
any part of the frontier has been delineated
by the commission, that part should be held
to be finally fixed and should not be open to
subsequent examination or revision.”5
At last, the ancient, bloody dispute
between the Ottoman and Persian Empires
was solved. Or so it seemed.

Origin of the New Conflict
In 1921, after Mesopotamia became the
Kingdom of Iraq, Faisal Ibn-Hussein was
enthroned as Iraq’s king. [Persia became
Iraq in 1935.] From the beginning, Iran’s
attitude toward the new kingdom was less
than cordial. For eight years, Iran was
reluctant to recognize Iraq and it became
obvious that Reza Shah Pahlavi was reviv
ing Iran’s old claims to the Shatt al-Arab
River and other border areas. However, as a
result of British mediation and Faisal’s
prudence, relations between Iraq and Iran
improved and, in August 1929, the two
countries exchanged diplomatic represen
tation. In 1932, King Faisal I and Premier
Nuri al-Sa’id visited Iran to negotiate vari
ous issues of concern to both countries, but
the two sides never agreed on a solution to
the border problem. It remained dormant.
When King Faisal died in 1933, Iran dis
avowed all obligations signed with the
Ottoman Empire and reinitiated its claim to
the Shatt al-Arab River.
Iraq stood adamant on its right to its
territory, referring to the 1913 Con
stantinople Protocol and the delineation of
the border by the international commission
in 1914. The view of the Iraqi government
was that the part of the Ottoman Empire
which formed the new state of Iraq was
formally fixed by this delineation.
Tension increased between the two
countries as news broke that Iran was
mobilizing and re-arming its military forces
with weapons purchased from Czechoslo
vakia. In November 1934, when the tension
peaked, Iraq took the issue to the League of
Nations for an appropriate solution to the
Shatt al-Arab dispute. The debates in the
League of Nations were lengthy but fruit

less as both sides remained adamant about
their claims, citing historical, geographical
and legal proofs. Iran refused Iraq’s sugges
tion to refer the issue to the International
Court of Justice.6
But after Italy invaded Ethiopia in 1935,
anxiety prevailed throughout the Middle
East. President Kemal Ataturk of Turkey
sent personal letters to the heads of both
Iraq and Iran, urging them to ’ve the
boundary issue as soon as possible in order
to confront the European menace. Turkey
also suggested that Iraq and Iran withdraw
their border issue from the League of
Nations so that it would be free to deal with
the security of the entire Middle East
region. The issue was withdrawn and both
sides began serious negotiations.
After giving some concession in the
Shatt al-Arab territory, Naji Shawkat, the
representative of Iraq, succeeded in nego
tiating the signing of the Treaty of Peaceful
Settlement of Dispute Between Iraq and
the Iranian Empire. Shawkat then contin
ued his contact with Turkey and Afghan
istan for a quadruple Middle East treaty
that included Iraq, Iran, Turkey, and
Afghanistan. On July 4, 1937, the four
countries signed a nonaggression treaty,
the Sa’ad Abad Pact.7Subsequently, for two
decades, Iran and Iraq nurtured a cordial
relationship.
In 1955, both Iraq and Iran, along with
Turkey, Pakistan and Great Britain, joined
in the Baghdad Pact. The royal regimes in
Baghdad and Tehran seemed to have agreed
on a peaceful coexistence.
But in 1958, when the Iraqi monarchy
was overthrown by a military coup, the
Shah of Iran, Muhammad Reza Pahlavi,
started a border feud all over again. The
New York Times reported:
“In a press conference held on November 29,
1958, the Shah of Iran discussed the eternal
dispute with Iraq. He stated that the
provisions of the border’s treaty o f1937are
unbearable and unprecedented. The Shah,
thus, expressed his desire to cancel the
treaty.”8
An extensive mass media campaign was
waged by Iran against Iraq, depicting the
latter as the usurper of Iranian territory.
Simultaneously, the Iranian army was mobi
lized along the southern border of Iraq.
Iraq’s response was rather rational.
Hashim Jawad, the Iraqi minister of foreign
affairs, turned to Western powers and world
public opinion indicating that Iran’s be
havior was threatening the interests of the

3

New Directions, Vol. 14 [], Iss. 4, Art. 5
Middle East as well as world peace.9
As a result of intervention by the United
States, Britain, and the Soviet Union, the
Shah was restrained; the situation was
defused, and a military conflagration on the
Iran-Iraq borders was averted.
The problem, however, was never de
cisively solved and the dispute lasted
throughout the military rule in Iraq be
tween 1958-1968, and several years after
the Ba’ath Party in 1968 took over the
reigns of power in Iraq. Finally, after
strenuous diplomatic efforts, The Treaty of
Algeria was signed in 1975 by Saddam
Hussein and Shah Muhammad Reza
Pahlavi.
Noticeably, all disputes between Iraq and
Iran during the last six decades have been
solved by means of peaceful diplomacy —
not war. Yet, a noteworthy point is that
during all these times, Iraq was negotiating
from the position of weakness and fear of
Iran’s preponderance. Iraq’s population and
territory equal one-third those of Iran. The
Treaty of Algeria was signed under circum
stances unfavorable to Iraq. In 1975, the
Shah, as a result of the influx of American
weapons, was at the peak of his might and
Iran was the most awesome power in the
Middle East. Iraq, on the other hand, was
fighting an internal war with its Kurdish
minority in the north, and the government
in Baghdad was rather shaky.
By 1980, however, the situation was
reversed. Iran, one year after the fall of the
Shah, was inflicted with internal turbulence
and the regime of Imam Khomeini seemed
vulnerable. For the first time, Iraq felt
powerful enough for a military confronta
tion with its larger neighbor. Hence the long
Gulf war (which lately has invited action by
the superpowers, particularly the United
States’ naval escorts for reflagged Kuwaiti
oil tankers to protect them against attacks
by Iran. Iraq, in 1984, started what is now
generally known as the “tanker war”).

Ideological Issues
Khomeini intends to establish an Islamic
republic headed by the Supreme jurispru
dence (williat al-faqih). He believes in the
establishment of an Islamic world governed
by the laws of God. The imperfection of the
existing world, Khomeini believes, stems
from two sources.10
First, he believes that the Western con
cept of the “nation-state” is philosophically
defective because it is the creation of man’s
“inferior mind.”
Second, he believes that the existing
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international system is essentially iniq
uitous partly because the superpowers
monopolize world power to themselves at
the expense of the masses.
From this stipulation, Khomeini divides
the world into two camps: The camp of the
“oppressors” (Mustakbirin), which is led by
both the United States and Soviet Union—
the “Greatest Satan” and the “Godless
Communist,” respectively — and the camp
of the “oppressed” (Mustaz’-a-fin), consist
ing mainly, but not exclusively, of the people
of the Islamic and other Third World
countries.
By creating an Islamic world whose
political and social values are derived from
the perfect laws set forth by God in His holy
book, the Qur’an, Khomeini believes man
will be able to establish a society which is as
close as possible to perfection.
The phrase “exporting Islamic Revolu
tion” is not simply a revolutionary cry; it is a
paramount pillar of the foreign policy of the
Islamic Republic of Iran. The doctrine of
the export of Islamic revolution aims simul
taneously at three interconnected goals in
Iran’s foreign policy (1) paving the way
toward the ultimate goal of the establish
ment of an Islamic world ruled by the
Shari’ah, (2) promoting populist, inde
pendent Islamic governments in other
states, and (3) protecting the first and only
such state and government in Iran.11
Facing Iran’s religious system is Iraq,
under the rule of Saddam Hussein, the
secretary of the Ba’ath revolutionary Arab
nationalist party. The Ba’ath Party as
sumed leadership when the Arab world
witnessed an important historical develop
ment — the radicalization of Arab na
tionalism in the 1950s. This can be traced to
the Palestine war in 1948 and the subse
quent creation of the state of Israel. So
traumatic to the Arabs was the loss of
Palestine that it precipitated transforma
tion of Arab nationalism, shifting the em
phasis from the attitude of romantic
glorification of the past to the failure of the
present. The Arab world was in need of a
new nationalist creed and leadership to
cope with the modern world and the Ba’ath
(meaning resurrection) Party arose to as
sume that responsibility.12
While Iraq and Iran are stubbornly en
gaged in a costly ideological war of mutual
annihilation, there are other forces that are
preventing all efforts of a settlement. The
Gulf war is providing several arms-producing countries with lucrative business. And
the United States remains suspicious of
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both Khomeini and Saddam Hussein. Both
leaders, the U.S. believes, are adamantly
against Israel and the influence of the
Western powers in the Middle East.
From the onset of his regime, Khomeini
flagrantly vilified the “zionist entity” and
also the United States.
President Saddam Hussein, also has
been invariably pan-Arabist, anti-Israel and
anti-West. He vehemently rejected the
“Camp David Accord” and urged all “pro
gressive” elements to oppose it and pursue
their struggle against the “zionist entity.”
Although the Iraqi regime has lately
softened its staunch anti-Israel stance and
has promised not to hamper peace efforts
between Israel and its Arab neighbors, the
United States still has its suspicion that
Iraq’s change of attitude is dictated by the
ephemeral contingency of the Gulf war.
As for Khomeini, it is not in his interest to
end the war so long as Saddam Hussein is
still in power. Any settlement, short of
toppling Saddam Hussein, would be tanta
mount to a total ideological defeat for
Khomeini, and would damage his credibility.
Khomeini’s strongest asset lies in his
religious status among Moslems. Most
Iranians, and non-Iranian Moslem zealots,
are firmly convinced that Imam Khomeini
has the Almighty God on his side. One of the
evidences of this support forged by the
followers of Khomeini is the manner in
which the Shah, the most powerful political
figure in the Middle East, was overthrown
in 1979. If it was not for God’s will, exclaim
believers, then how could Khomeini, the
exiled, frail octogenarian clergyman, topple
the Shah, commander of the most formida
ble military machine in the Middle East?
Besides his local awesome power, the Shah
had the United States, the most powerful
country on this planet, on his side. Yet,
despite all these factors, Khomeini, de
pending entirely on his religious influence
among the people of Iran, was able to
overthrow him.
As far as the war with Iraq is concerned,
the Iranian leadership sees it as a holy war
(Jihad) against the socialist “infidel re
gime” of Iraq. Khomeini, counting on
Divine help, made the pledge that he would
not stop the war before removing Saddam
Hussein and the Ba’athist regime from
Baghdad.13 Thus, if, for any reason, Kho
meini agrees to stop the war without
fulfilling his pledge, then his religious foun
dation would be utterly shattered. His
followers would come to the conclusion that
either Khomeini does not possess the

Divine support he claims, or, the more
terrifying explanation: all religious founda
tions are nothing but a mammoth hoax.
Contrary to Khomeini’s dilemma, the
position of Saddam Hussein is much more
relaxed. He has shrewdly made overtures
toward a peaceful settlement, but was
rejected several times by Iran. Thus, Sad
dam Hussein may have gained the sympa
thy of the international community. He is
aware that if his peace efforts bear fruit, he
would be able to boast that he has been able
to confront Iran’s preponderance for several
years and keep Iraq’s integrity intact.
Meanwhile, the destructive war is sap
ping the human and economic sources of
both countries, and despite the efforts of
several Islamic countries (and a U.N. cease
fire resolution) it seems that there is no
hope for a peaceful settlement for the
foreseeable future unless either Ayatullah
Khomeini or Saddam Hussein no longer
remain on the scene.

Conclusion
The Gulf war is basically a conflict between
religious and secular ideologies, both of
which are attempting to prevail in the
Middle East. The origin of both ideologies
can be traced to the same sources —
frustration with backwardness and anti
imperialist feelings.
Before the Islamic revolution, [the vast
majority of] the Iranian people were under
the yoke of the throne of Shah Muhammad
Reza Pahlavi. They were brutalized by a
police state, impoverished and controlled
by Western interests. The religious outcry
by Khomeini for freedom, dignity and
economic equity under an Islamic regime
was met by thunderous approval of the
Iranian masses. And the regime, eight
years after the revolution, is showing no
signs of weakness. The Iranians hope that,
when the war is over, Iran can still utilize its
vast resources and accomplish dramatic
development and that their regime would
become a model for the rest of the Moslem
world.
Ba’athism, on the other hand, under the
leadership of Iraq’s Saddam Hussein, is an
ideology stipulating that religion has no role
in the function of government. The Ba’ath
Party intends to mobilize the 125 million
Arabs in the region and steer them to build a
“United Arab Socialist country” in order to
cure the Arab world from its backwardness
and other social ills.
Obviously, both ideologies aspire to serve
their peoples and provide for their welfare,
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but they differ in their methods of imple
menting their plans.
All these dreams of good future and
prosperity will go unfulfilled unless Iran and
Iraq agree to end their destructive war and
steer their energies toward the welfare of
their peoples. Should Iran and Iraq fail to
come to a peaceful agreement, their irre
placeable resources will be depleted and
their peoples will suffer for a long time. □

Mamoon Amin Zaki, Ph.D., is an associate pro
fessor of political science at LeMoyne-Owens Col
lege, Memphis, Tenn.
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